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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
restraint. 13 Likewise, in Greene v. Kirkwood 14 a condition that the
devisee should not marry below her social standing was held not to
be a general restraint. In Onderdonk v. Onderdonk 15 a condition restraining the devisee from marrying without consent of those interested
in her welfare was held valid.
The distinction between a condition subsequent and a limitation is
arbitrary and may seem an undue interpretive assumption by the
courts; yet it is wise. The courts have employed somewhat specious
reasoning to get around an unpopular rule. In determining the intention of the testator, which is always of primary importance in construing a will, the courts have been harassed by precedent. While precedent indicates that an unreasonable condition in restraint of marriage
is void, the testator says in substance that he wants his property to go
to the devisee only until she remarries. Whenever the testator has not
first devised a definite estate, the courts say he does not intend to
give a specific estate subject to a condition subsequent, but merely a
qualified or determinable estate. There is no condition subsequent.
However, when a definite estate is given, the restraint of marriage is
a condition subsequent and the precedent must prevail over the intention of the testator.
Whenever possible, therefore, the courts have given expression to
the testator's intention: To provide for the devisee only so long as
she does not marry or remarry. And that is wise.
Martin P. Torborg.

RECENT DECISIONS
AUCTIONS AND AuCTIONEERS-STATUTORY REGULATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAI.

-REGULATION

OF TRADE OR Businss

LAW

N GENERA.--In Wisconsin a statute pro-

vides that "No person, firm or corporation shall sell or dispose of or offer for
sale at public auction, between the hours of six o'clock in the evening and eight
o'clock the following morning, any gold, silver, plated ware, precious or semiprecious stones, watches, clocks or jewelry of any nature whatsoever." Section
130.07 (1), 1933 Stats. An ordinance of the city of Racine provides that "Sales,

by public auction, of the stock of any person, firm or corporation, shall be held
on successive days, Sundays and legal holidays excluded, and shall continue not
more than thirty days in all within the period of one year. And no such auction
shall be held between the hours of six P. M. and eight A. M. of the following
day." Section 10.05 (15). The Plaintiff, a jeweler of the city of Racine, paid all

the necessary fees precedent to the holding of an auction sale of jewelry, and
on the seventh day of October, 1933, began such sale. In spite of advice
Is Shackleford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212 (1857).
14
15

1 Ir. 130 (1895).
127 N. Y. 196, 27 N. E. 839 (1891).
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and warnings, the plaintiff continued his sales until about 10 or 11 o'clock each
evening for thirty days thereafter. The plaintiff, by this suit, sought to restrain the
mayor of Racine, the chief of police of that city, and the other officers thereof
from interfering with the plaintiff's asserted right to so conduct his sale. The
trial court overruled the defendants' demurrer, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed this ruling with directions to sustain the demurrer. Doering v.
•Swoboda, 253 N. W. 657 (Wis. 1934).
In reaching its decision the supreme court was at the outset confronted with
the case of Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 542, decided by the same court
in 1869. In that case it was held that the city of Appleton had no authority
under its charter to pass an ordinance prohibiting a licensed auctioneer's selling
any goods, wares, or merchandise after sundown. The court there was of the
opinion that such ordinances should be for the government and good order of
the city, for the suppression of vice, the prevention of crime, and for the benefit
of the health, trade, and commerce thereof, in order to avoid contravention of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. Apparently the counsel representing the city failed to make
such showing for the court was of the opinion that the prohibition was general
in its character, and restrained the transaction of such business at particular hours
during each day when it is customary to transact it, without any sufficient cause
shown, and that therefore the ordinance was unreasonable and unlawfully interfered with the freedom of trade.
The Hayes case was followed in Wisconsin by State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89,
114 N. W. 137 (1908). Justice Marshall, giving the opinion of the court, said:
"The general declaration in the Constitution of the purposes of civil government
is a limitation on legislative powers, designed, in part at least, to prevent clearly
unreasonable enactments restricting natural private rights." Both the Hayes and
Redmon cases were cited favorably in Michigan in People v. Gibbs, 186 Mich.
127, 152 N. W. 1053, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 830 (1915). Here the statute in question
was very similar to that in the main case, with the additional clause permitting
a buyer within five days from the date of the sale to return the article purchased, if not of the quality represented, and to recover the price paid. The
only violation thereof was the conducting of the sale after six o'clock in the
evening. No other misconduct appeared and presumably the business was run
honestly. There was no showing as to how business so conducted did, or could,
at that particular time of day, annoy or disturb the public, or menace the peace,
good order, health, or welfare of the community more than before six o'clock,
or more than other lines of business carried on at the same time. The decision
was that the attempted prohibition was a discrimination in restraint of trade, and
an unreasonable regulation, beyond the limits of the police power conferred upon
the municipality to license and regulate trade or business.
But the court here, in the Doering case, discounts the prior Wisconsin cases
and the case from Michigan, saying, as to the latter, that the provision for the
return of the goods within five days probably influenced the court in holding
such ordinance unreasonable. In overruling its own former decisions, the court
relies on the passage of years and the great changes having taken place since 1869.
Quoting from the opinion of Nelson, J.: "New evils have arisen to prevent which
new laws are required. What was not considered against public policy in 1869
may obviously be considered so today in the light of the kno*ledge acquired and
the experiences had during later years. . . . We conclude that the section 130.07
is a deliberate declaration of the present public policy of this State, is'not an
unreasonable interference with the freedom of trade, does not go beyond the
legitimate field of reasonable regulation, and is a proper exercise of the police
power."
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The courts of New York went through a similar process of evolution. In
Rochester v. Close, 35 Hun 208 (1885), it was held that the city under the
power to regulate "ringing of bells and the crying of goods for sale at auction
or otherwise, and to prevent disturbing noises in the streets," could not prohibit
the auction sale of jewelry after sunset. The statute was interpreted as not giving
the authority to regulate or prohibit, but as relating solely to the manner of
advertising sale by public outcry, and authorizing regulation of that manner of
advertising, allowing no interference in any manner with sales, whether at auction
or otherwise. Then in Buffalo v. Marion, 34 N. Y. S. 945 (1895), and in Biddles,
Inc., v. Enright, 203 N. Y. S. 920, 208 App. Div. 790 (1925), the court decided
that ordinances providing that sales of certain goods at public auction shall be
made in the daytime, are not so arbitrary nor such an unlawful interference with
the sale of jewelry at public auction as to be unconstitutional; that such regulation was necessary to prevent fraud, protect the safety and welfare of the community. A limitation on the New York holdings is found in Robinson v. Wood,
196 N. Y. S. 209 (1922), holding that an ordinance prohibiting auctions in the
evenings is not a proper exercise of the power delegated to the city to license
and regulate auctions and auctioneers if adopted for the purpose of stifling competition.
The basic reason for this modern tendency toward the sustaining of such
prohibitions is concisely stated in Ex parte West, 243 Pac. 55 (Cal. 1925). The
court there said: "Jewelry auctions are often mere schemes for trapping and defrauding the unwary; that the people, in general, are unskilled in the art of
determining the purity of gold and silver, or the genuineness of diamonds, particularly at a glance under artificial light." As a result it is quite possible for
certain evil disposed persons to conduct mock auctions, whereby worthless jewelry
is sold to innocent persons, causing them many times great pecuniary loss. This
danger to the buying public has in the recent cases been generally recognized, and
courts have read into statutes, limiting the hours at which there may be an auction
sale of jewelry, an intent to prevent fraud and deception in such sale. The reasonableness of the prohibition against evening auctions has been upheld in the
following cases, in addition to those cited above: Davidson v. Phelps, 214 Ala.
236, 107 So. 86 (1926); Ex parte West, 75 Cal. App. 591, 243 Pac. 55 (1925);
Levy v. Stone, 97 Fla. 458, 121 So. 565 (1929); Clein & Ellman v. City of Atlanta, 159 Ga. 121, 124 S. E. 882 (1927); Mogul v. Gaither, 142 Md. 380, 121
Atl. 32 (1923); State ex rel. Cook v. Bates, 101 Minn. 301, 112 N. W. 67 (1907);
Matheny v. Simmons, 139 So. 172 (Miss. 1932); Wagman v. City of Trenton,
102 N. J. L. 492, 134 Atl. 115 (1926); City of Roanoke v. Fisher, 137 Va. 75,
119 S. E. 259 (1924).
Robert R. Waterson.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoNsTRucTIOx, OPERATION, AND ENFORCEmENT OF CONSTrruTIdNAL PROVISIONS-OPERATION AS TO LAWS PREVIouSLY IN FoRc--CimsNAL
LAw-NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIME AND DEFENSES IN GENERAL-STATUTORY

PROVISIONs-REPEAL.--One of the most important effects of the ratification of
the Twenty-First Amendment to the Federal Constitution is pointed out in the
recent case of United States v. Chambers, 54 S. Ct. 434, decided February 5, 1934.
Claude Chambers and Byrum Gibson were indicted in the District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina for conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act, and for possessing and transporting intoxicating liquors, contrary
to that Act, in Rockingham county in that State. The indictment was filed on
June 5, 1933. Chambers pleaded guilty, but his prayer for judgment was continued
until the December term. On December 6, 1933, the case was called for trial as
to Gibson. Chambers then filed a plea in abatement, and Gibson filed a demurrer
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to the indictment, each upon the ground that the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings under the indictment. The District judge sustained the
contention of the defendants and dismissed the indictment. The government appealed to the Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of the District Judge,
Chief justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court. The first question involved in the Supreme Court's decision was the exact date of the ratification of
the Twenty-First Amendment. In the case of Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 41
S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994, this question was decided, the court taking judicial
notice of the fact that the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment was consummated on December 5, 1933. Due to the fact that the ratification of the TwentyFirst Amendment rendered the Eighteenth Amendment completely inoperative
from that date on, all prosecutions pending which were based upon violations
of the National Prohibition Act were shorn of their justification. The continued
prosecution of Chambers and Gibson necessarily depended upon the continued
life of thg statute which the prosecution sought to apply.
In illustration of the principle that in case a statute is repealed or rendered
inoperative no further proceedngs can be had to enforce it in pending prosecutions, unless competent authority has kept the statute alive for that purpose,
Chief Justice Hughes cited the ruling of Chief justice Marshall in the case
of Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281, 283, 3 L. Ed. 101, 102 (1809),:
"... it has been long settled, on general principles, that after the expiration or
repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision
be made for that purpose by statute." In The State of Maryland v. The Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. Co., 3 How. 534, 552, 11 L. Ed. 714, 722 (1845), Chief Justice
Taney observed that "The repeal of the law imposing the penalty is of itself a
remission."
Technically speaking, the "will" of the American people, expressed in the
Eighteenth Amendment, gave the Federal government the power to enforce the
National Prohibition Act, and in not only a technical but also in an absolute
way the Twenty-First Amendment expressed the will of the people. That will
was to the effect that no further criminal proceedings be had under the act
which had been automatically repealed.
In appealing this case, the government sought to avoid the implication pointed
out in the preceding paragraph by invoking the general saving provision enacted by Congress in relation to the repeal of statutes in general. That provision
is to the effect that penalties and liabilities theretofore incurred are not to be
extinguished by the repeal of a statute "unless the repealing Act shall so expressly
provide" and to support the prosecutions in such cases the statute is to be treated
as remaining in force. Rev. St. § 13, 1 USCA § 29. This argument having been
raised, the issue in the case was whether this provision was applicable to amendments to the Constitution or only to Federal statutes. To justify the continuance
of this prosecution against Chambers and Gibson the Supreme Court would be
forced to rule that Congress had the power to vary the terms or the effect
of a ratified amendment. This would be giving to Congress the power to expand its constitutional authority. The Twenty-First Amendment contained no
saving clause similar to that provision which applies to the repeal of Federal
statutes. Congress might have proposed such a clause in drafting the proposals
of the Amendment, but it did not. Congress exercised its powers to their fullest
extent in making the proposals, and having once submitted the Amendment to
the convention of each state for ratification, it was powerless to act further.
In the words of Chief Justice Hughes: "The creator of Congress has denied to
it the authority it formerly possessed, and this denial, being unqualified, necessarily defeats any legislative attempt to extend that authority."
Hugh E. Wall.
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CONSTITUTINAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-REGULATION OF CHARGES OR
PSicy.-In Nebbia. v. People oj State of New York, 54 S. Ct. 505, a five to four
decision rendered March 5, 1934, the Supreme Court of the United States dedared constitutional a New York statute fixing a minimum price for the sale
of milk. The statute established a milk Control Board with general power to
regulate the entire milk industry of New York state, including the production,
transportation, manufacture, storage, delivery and sale. This Board prescribed
nine cents per quart as the minimum at which a store might sell. The appellant,
Nebbia, a storekeeper, sold two quarts and a five-cent loaf of bread for eighteen
cents. An information charged that' by so doing he committed a misdemeanor.
In defense he pleaded that the order of the Board deprived him of the equal protection of the laws and of the due process guaranteed him by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal constitution. The controlling opinion, written by
Justice Roberts, after denying that the appellant is deprived of equality of the
laws, supports the statute on the grounds that "an emergency" existed. Justice
Roberts reasons from the premise that in emergencies the police power of a state
is virtually unlimited in regard to industries of public interest. Quoting from
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877), he says: "'. . . it is apparent
that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of
private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due
process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all.'" (Italics
are mine.) The Justice encounters two difficulties of major importance in this
assumption: (1) By what is the existence of an emergency to be judged?; and
(2) What is meant by an industry of public interest?
Justice McReynolds, in his dissenting opinion, asks: "What circumstances
give force to an 'emergency' statute? In how much of the state must they obtain? Everywhere, or will a single county suffice? How many farmers must have
been impoverished or threatened violence to create a crisis of sufficient gravity?
. . . If prices for agricultural products become high can consumers claim a crisis
exists and demand that the Legislature fix less ones? Or are producers alone to
be considered, consumers neglected?" A usual test of an emergency is that the
situation be temporary. But this is faulty in that it is "possible to conceive of
a sudden combination of events which would require prompt drastic action and
yet might well be expected to be permanent." Mott, Due Process of Law, 352.
To call this an "emergency" would be to stretch the concept of the term. Yet
it would require emergency action. Merely because the public at large- will be
benefited by certain legislation, that legislation is not justified unless the situation
be one of "great impending danger," or calls for immediate action.
For the sake of argument, we will concede that the milk situation was an
emergency. May the legislature have a free hand under such circumstances? The
authorities hold otherwise. In his dissenting opinion in Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.
332, at 377 (1917), Justice Pitney said: "An emergency can neither create a
power not excuse a defiance of limitations upon the powers of the government."
"The mere existence of an emergency will not justify arbitrary and oppressive
action unless that action has a real prospect of meeting the exigencies of the
situation." Mott, supra, at pp. 354, 355. In meeting the danger which has arisen,
the legislature is limited to only those means which "may reasonably be expected
to cope with the situation." Mott, supra, at p. 355. In this case, the New York
legislature deprived a milk dealer of his right to contract as he saw fit. The excuse was the existence of an "emergency." We have already seen that an emergency empowers the legislature to deprive a man of his most sacred rights only
in extreme cases. It was argued that this was not such a case. In answer, the
court declared the dairy industry to be one "affected with a public interest."
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And here is the second difficulty Justice Roberts encountered. In Williams v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 S. Ct. (1929), the court said, in reference
to such industries: "Affirmatively, it [The test by which the legislative power to
fix prices of commodities, use of property, or services must be measured, namely,
the phrase "affected with a public interest."] means that a business or property,
in order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or be so employed
as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use
thereby in effect granted to the public. . . . Negatively, it does not mean that a
business is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because
the public are warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance." But Justice Roberts, in the principal case, says that when one devotes
his property to a use "in which the public has an interest," he in effect "grants
to the public an interest in that use" and must submit to he controlled for the
common good, this result to follow whether or not the dedication to the public
was voluntary. But all enterprises have something of a public interest. If Justice
Robert's contention were followed, there could be no private industries, for where
could we draw the line of demarcation?
In many previous cases the Supreme Court follows Williams v. StandardOil Co.
In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 43 S. Ct. 630, 633, 262
U. S. 522, 536 (1923), in an opinion rendered by Chief Justice Taft, the court
said: "The public may suffer from high prices or strikes in many trades, but the
expression 'clothed with a public interest,' as applied to a business, means more
than that the public welfare is affected by the continuity or by the price at
which a commodity is sold or a service rendered." In the same case Chief Justice
Taft continued: ". . . one does not devote one's property or business to the
public use or clothe it with a public interest merely because one makes commodities for, and sells to, the public. . . ." And in Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
Minnesota, 47 S. Ct. 506, 508, 274 U. S. 1, 9 (1927), Justice McReynolds said:
"'Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection with this
business [dairying], is adequate reason for hedging it about by proper regulations.
But this is not enough to justify destruction of one's rights to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright way. Certainly there is no profession, no
business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for reprehensible practices;
and as to everyone of them, no doubt, some can be found quite ready earnestly
to maintain that its suppression would be in the public interest.'"
It is evident that in the principal case the Supreme Court has overruled its
former decisions. In United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Company, 41 S. Ct. 298,
225 U. S. 8I (1921), it was held that an act of Congress forbidding anyone to
make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing with
necessaries was unconstitutional. In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, supra, it was said that "never has regulation of food preparation been
extended to fixing wages or the prices to the public." The holding in Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, supra, was that a Minnesota statute prohibiting
dairy products buyers from discriminating between localities was an "interference
with freedom of contract," irrespective of motive. This last case is directly in
point with Nebbia v. People of State of New York. The appellant, Nebbia, pleaded that the New York statute was an interference with his freedom of contract.
The court answered that even if it were, the existence of an "emergency" excused such interference. Thus, it made an about-face to what it said in Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota by holding that a sufficient motive legalizes the
deprivation of freedom of contract.
That the court has reversed itself is not per se important. Certainly it has
a right to do that. What is important are the consequences such reversal has on
state powers through a more narrow construction of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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For many years the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment was
a serious obstacle to social legislation. As early as 1890, the thinking minds of
the country realized the fearsome consequences of the "laissez-faire" policy that
has so greatly influenced our legislation. But the realization of those consequences
was one thing; to eliminate them was quite another. When, in 1903, a New York
law prohibited the night work of women in industrial establishments, it was
promptly declared unconstitutional, because, as the court said: "She [an adult
female] is no more a ward of the state than is a man. She is entitled to enjoy,
unmolested, her liberty of person, and her freedom to work for whom she pleases,
where she pleases, and as long as she pleases, within the general limits operative
upon all persons alike, and shall we say that this is valid legislation, which doses
the doors of a factory to her before and after certain hours? I think not."
Quoted by Mangold in "Social Pathology" from U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 321. "Labor Laws That Have Been Declared Unconstitutional," p. 4.
Following immediately came the abuses which this decision made possible. One
establishment in New York City employed women on Thursday nights until
midnight. These same women began work the next morning, toiled all day, and
continued into the night, working sometimes until late Saturday morning. See
Mangold's Social Pathology, pp. 683, 684.
The decisions of the court show us the constant struggle of fair-minded men
against judges ruled by precedent instead of by public policy. Gradually the
thinkers made progress. This latest achievement will, no doubt, clinch the battle
for them.
The attitude assumed by the court in Nebbia v. People of State of New York
has narrowed the interpretation of the "due process clause" and of the guaranty
of "equality of laws" by widening the number of activities which may be subjected to state legislation which will restrict individual freedom. No longer may
a man cry out "Unconstitutional!" against every law that seems to restrict his
freedom of contract or to deprive him of his property. The reasoning of the
court has finally come to rest on the sound ethical principle that the good of the
greater number is more important than that of the individual or of a small
group of individuals. When the rights of the individual contravene the good
of the whole, those rights should be curtailed.
The gateway to social legislation has at last been opened. Labor laws, health
laws and other legislation that is sorely needed and which has been frustrated
by men who failed to realize that the constitution should be flexible if it is to
endure, now stand a good chance of being enacted. The court has responded to
the American sentiment that judicial veto of the will of the people, where that
will is reasonable, should not become tyrannical. If the constitution is to remain an instrument "of the people, by the people, and for the people," re-interpretation of its fundamental concepts must be made. And the first big step in
that direction has been taken.
One may say that this conclusion is too optimistic because it is drawn from
a five to four decision. But it must be remembered that previous cases in which
the public good was at stake were usually defeated by a five to four vote of
the Supreme Court. The conversion of even one judge is signal. There is now
a precedent set to guide the four conservatives. In the usual decisions handed
down, they argued, and, alas!, with conviction, that there was no precedent for
other than the traditional interpretation of the "due process clause." This exit
is blocked! These conservative judges may now adhere to their principle of
following precedent because a new precedent has been set. In doing this they
will be legislating for the good of the majority, the aim of true democracy.
Francis W. Matthys.
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FRAUD--DAMAGES-DFERENCE

BETWFa

VALUE AND PRICE

PAI.-The court

in considering the measure of damages in the recent case of Federal-American
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. McReynolds, 67 Fed. (2d) 251 (1933), which was an
action for fraud practiced in an exchange of properties agreement, said that
whether the defrauded party sued on the contract or sued for fraud the relief
to which he would be entitled, if he proved his case, would be the difference
between the value of the property which he received and the value of the property which he parted with under the contract, and the measure of damages would
be the same at law and in equity. Also, that if the property received by the defrauded party had been disposed of by him before he became aware of the
fraud, or if the property with which he parted with had been disposed of by
the other party making the fraudulent representations, the measure of damages
would be the difference between the values of the two properties.
There is great disagreement in this field as to the method of arriving at
substantial damages. The question involved is whether the plaintiff should be
given the difference between the value of the property he received and that
with which he parted with or the value of the property if it had been as
represented. Professor Bauer says that "The weight of authority gives the
plaintiff the value of his bargain, thus causing the action to savor of contract
rather than of tort, so far as the measure of damages is concerned." Bauer on
Damages 388.
In Peek v. Derry (1887] L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 541 an action of deceit was
brought for damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of reliance upon false
statements made by the defendant in the sale of shares of stock in a tramway
company. The court took the view that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover for the loss he had actually sustained; that is, the difference between the
value of the shares in his hands and what he had actually paid for them, the
contract having been completely performed by the plaintiff. This represents the
minority view. Yet the principle is logically correct because in tort actions generally the plaintiff recovers only for the loss actually produced by defendant's
tort. The leading Federal case of Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125, 33 L. Ed. 279
(1889), supports this doctrine. That was an action for damages for false and
fraudulent representations in the sale of shares of mining stock, and it was
held that the measure of damages was not the difference between the contract
price and the market value if the property had been as represented but rather
the difference between the actual values of the two properties. judge Fuller,
speaking for the court, said: "What the plaintiff might have gained is not the
question, but what he had lost by being deceived into the purchase. The suit
was not brought for breach of contract." Accord: Cross v. Bouck, 175 Cal. 253,
165 Pac. 702 (1917); Walker v. MacMillan, 62 Colo. 136, 160 Pac. 1062 (1916);
Browning v. Rodman, 268 Pa. 575, 111 Atl. 877 (1920).
But the weight of authority in the state courts allows a plaintiff, suing in
tort for deceit in the sale or exchange of properties, to recover the same amount
as he would have recovered if he had sued in contract. Thus in Stiles v, White,
11 Met. 356, 45 Am. Dec. 214 (1846), plaintiff sued in case for deceit in the sale
of a horse. The defendant contended that if the horse at the time of sale was
worth all the plaintiff paid for him then plaintiff suffered no damages and the
action would not lie. But the court held that the measure of damages was the
difference between the actual value of the horse sold and the value of such a
horse as that was represented to be by the defendant, thus giving the plaintiff,
in a tort action, where the defendant falsely represented the article sold, the
value of his bargain.
In Whitney v. Allaire, 1 N. Y. 305, 312 (1848), the court said: "The measure
of damages in an action upon a warranty, and for fraud in the sale of personal
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property, are the same. In either case they are determined by the difference in
value between the article sold and what it should he according to the warranty
or representation."
In the McReynolds case it seems that the court erred in saying that whether
the plaintiff sued in contract or in tort the measure of damages under the
doctrine of Smith v. Bolles would give the plaintiff the difference between the
value of the property which he received and the value of the property with
which he parted under the contract. In Smith v. Bolles the court specifically
states that the action was not brought on contract, so the damages awarded
were according to tort liability.
Two leading state cases supporting the doctrine of Smith v, Bolles are Cross
v. Bouch, supra, and Browning v. Rodman, supra. The first was an action for
deceit, and the court said: "The measure of damages suffered by one who is
fraudulently induced to exchange property is the difference between the actual
value of that which he parted with and of that which he receives under the contract." In Browning v. Rodman the defendant had fraudulently sold to plaintiff
a garden to be used in growing ginseng. The court, in awarding damages, said:
"The measures of damages suffered by one fraudulently induced to exchange properties, is the difference betwen the actual value of that which he parted with
and the actual value of that which he received."
Granville P. Ziegler.

JUDGEs-CoMPENSATION AND FEES-CHANGE IN A-iOUNT DuLiNG TERM or
OFPICE-CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw.--"By section 13 of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of June 16, 1933 (Public No. 78), it was provided that: 'for the
period of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, remaining after the date of the enactment of this Act, and during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1934, the retired
pay of judges (whose compensation, prior to retirement or resignation, could not,
under the Constitution, have been diminished) is reduced by 15 per centum.'"
Booth v. United States and Amidon v. United States, 54 S. Ct. 379 (1934).
By reason of this Act the pay of many "retired" federal judges was reduced.
The question as to whether or not this reduction of pay was a violation of
the Constitutional provision that "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times,
receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office," § 1, Art. 3 Fed. const., was raised in the cases of
Booth v. United States and Amidon v. United States, supra. Due to a parallel
set of facts the two cases were tried jointly on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Stated briefly, the facts are: Both judges, Booth and Amidon, had had increases in salary during their tenure of office. Both had retired at the age of
seventy years, pursuant to the statute authorizing the retirement of federal judges.
Judicial Code, § 260, as amended by the Act of Feb. 25, 1919, c. 29, § 6, 40 Stat.
1157, U. S. C. title 28, § 375, and the Act of March 1, 1929, c. 419, 45 Stat. 1422
(Supp. III, title 28, § 375 [28 U. S. C. A. § 275 ]). Upon a reduction in pay based
upon the provision in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, each judge
brought suit in the Court of Claims, asserting that the Act violates the provision of the Constitution, which forbids diminution of the compensation of federal judges during their continuance in office. The government demurred to each
petition. In ruling on the demurrer the Supreme Court had to answer two questions: (1) Does a United States Judge, upon retirement relinquish or retain his office?
(2) Does the Constitution prohibit reduction of the compensation to which the
judge was entitled at the date of retirement? In other words, would such diminu-
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tion of salary be disallowed even if the compensation after reduction exceeded
the amount which the judge was receiving when he first took office?
The decision of the Supreme Court hinged upon its interpretation of the
phrase "continuance in office." Does a United States judge, upon retirement,
relinquish or retain his office? The Act of Congress, cited in the preceding paragraph, clearly sets forth the answer to this question in providing that ". . . instead of resigning, any judge . . . who is qualified to resign . . . may retire,

upon the salary of which he is then in receipt, from regular active service on
the bench. . .

."

In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Hughes

points out that the retirement is from active service and not from office, for the
retiring judge may be called upon by the senior circuit judge to perform judicial
duties in his own circuit, or by the Chief Justice to perform them in another
circuit, and may be authorized to perform such as he may be willing to undertake.
Hence, by retiring pursuant to the Statute, a federal judge does not relinquish
his office.
Returning then to the first consideration, as to whether or not a retired federal
judge is protected by the constitutional provision prohibiting the diminution
of his compensation, the evidence shows that the decision must be in favor of
the petitioners. The argument of the government was to the effect that the holding of an office involves the performance of duties, and since no duties are obligatory on one who has retired under the Act, he can not be said to hold any
office. In support of this contention the government pointed out that, under the
Act, a successor to the retiring judge is to be appointed; and that this provision
is in open contradiction to the idea of the retiring judge retaining his office.
In answering this worthy objection, Chief justice Hughes characteristically pointed
out that the evident purpose of the Act was that the judges should render
valuable judicial service after retirement, as had been proved in the instant case,
and that such a worthy end should not be allowed to be defeated by the mere
fact that the phraseology of the Act had not been well chosen.
Even the Solicitor General, with "commendable candor," admitted that the
answer to the second question raised by the government's demurrer must be in
the affirmative. In support of its decision on this second question, the Court
made reference to Commonwealth ex rel. Hepburn v. Mann, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.)
403 (1843), City of New Orleans v. Lea, 14 La. Ann. 197 (1859), Long v. Watts,
183 N. C. 99, 110 S. E. 765, 22 A. L. R. 277 (1922), cases wherein the facts
were closely analogous and the decisions were based upon provisions of the state
constitutions similar to Article 3, § 1, of the Federal constitution.
Hugh E. Wall.

TRUSTS--INDEFINITE BM;cFIC.UES-PRECATORY WORDs.-The recent decision
in In re Hayes' Will, 263 N. Y. 219, 188 N. E. 717 (1934), considers the question
of precatory words and their effect. For a long time this has been one of the
parts of the law of Trusts and Wills open to discussion with the result that no
definite rule has been established.
Precatory words are ". . . expressions in a will praying or requesting that
a thing shall be done. A trust created by such words which are more like words
of entreaty and permission than of command or certainty." 2 Bouvier 718. Examples of precatory words are: "wish," "desire," "my further request is." Not
all of these words create trusts nor wiU any particular word create a trust, the
meaning being derived from the entire document.
As nearly as can be ascertained, the controversy started back in 1712 with
an anonymous case reported in 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 291, 8 Vin. 72, 22 Eng.
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Rep. 244. In that case a baron gave all his estate to his wife, and said: "I
desire and request my said wife to give all her estate which she shall have at
the time of her death to her and my nearest relations equally amongst them."
It was held: "The words being so general both in respect of the money and of
the persons to take it, it does not amount to a devise but it is only a recommendation to the wife to make such a disposition; but if he had desired she
would have given it to a particular person it would have been a good devise."
This was a statement of the old theory which favored the creation of a trust
when property was given absolutely to any person and the same person was
entreated or wished to dispose of that property in favor of another, if the
words were so used that upon the whole they ought to be construed as imperative
and if the subject matter and the objects of the recommendation were certain.
An interesting insight into the theory of wills and their construction is given
in Bland v. Bland, 9 Mod. 478, 88 Eng. Rep. 586 (1745), where it was insisted
by the plaintiff that any desire in a will is equal to a devise because a will is
no more than a declaration of the testator what he will have done after his
death; and if this be sufficiently declared it must take place; but the court held
that a person in his will must velle not only petere et rogare. So the court, through
the subtleties of latin, expressed its conception of the requirements of a good
devise.
The recent decision in In re Hayes Will follows the modern construction
which does not favor the establishment of trusts from precatory words unless
the intention is very clearly shown. On October 27, 1930, the testatrix died
leaving a will which she had dictated three days before her death. The residuary
clause was as follows: "Any remainder after these bequests have been made,
I leave to Arthur Garfield Hays to use at his discretion in promoting the ends
of justice." The question was whether this devise gave full title to Hays or
whether there was a trust established. It was held that this clause gave full title
to Hays. The words following a conveyance of full title must express a clear
intention of cutting it down and impose an obligation on the legatee to carry
out an expressed purpose. The discretion given the devisee kept the gift from
being a trust or an attempt to create a trust but merely imposed a moral
obligation on him to carry out the wishes of the testator.
Whenever the objects of the supposed recommendatory trust are not certain
or definite, whenever the property to which it is attached is not certain or
definite, whenever a clear discretion or choice to act or not to act is given, words
of recommendation or request will not create a trust. Smullin v. Wharton, 73
Neb. 667, 103 N. W. 288 (1905).
The test of precatory trusts is the clear intent of the testator to imperatively
control the conduct of the party to whom the language of the will is addressed
by the expression of the desire and not to commit to lis discretion the exercise
of the option to comply or refuse to comply with the suggestion made. Gotch v.
Burnes, 132 Fed. 485 (1904).
And so the law has artfully shifted the duty of discovering what the testator
really meant from its own conscience to that of the legatee. Perhaps this is
desirable since legatee, with his more intimate knowledge of the facts, is usually
in a better position to make the decision.
Thomas H. Nelson.
USURY-EFFECT OF USURY-VALIDITY Oir CONTRACT OR INDEBTEDNESS-CONTRACTS-CONTRAVENTION or LAW IN GENERAL.-From the earliest times no people
who had any considerable commercial or financial structure existed without having
laws against usury. This has been true because of the very obvious reason that in
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the power of the lender to alleviate the needs of the borrower lies the potential
power to oppress. This view was for a timed carried to an extreme and an abolition of all interest resulted. In this country, however, the doctrine that any interest is usurious has never been accepted. The common law, as adopted in the
United States, has been that no rate of interest is illegal. Consequently, in the
absence of statutory enactment there is no rate of interest which is considered
illegal. Usury in this country rests wholly on the statutes of the various states.
"Usury," 27 R. C. L. p. 203, and cases cited. It logically follows then, that usury
in the United States has taken on this general broad definition, namely, taking
more than the statute allows upon a loan or forbearance of a debt. In some
states the contract in which usury is charged is declared void. In some, the contract is not void, but the entire interest is declared forfeited. In other states only
the excess of interest charged is declared forfeited while interest at the legal
rate is held to be recoverable. Clark on Contracts (4th Ed.) 364.
Indiana, by statute, has protected borrowers of money from the charging of
excessive rates by unconscionable, money lenders. Consequently, when usury is
raised as a defense to an action to recover money, loaned with interest, at the
contractual rate it becomes necessary for the courts to interpret the statutes.
This is what the Appellate Court of Indiana did in the recent case of Geyer v.
Spencer, 189 N. E. 429 (Ind. 1934). In this case Mina E. Spencer filed a claim
against the estate of Durward M. Luse, deceased, as follows:
"'May 14, 1927, for money had and received by Durward M. Luse, deceased,
of Mina E. Spencer, with interest thereon at 6% per annum from May 14, 1927,
until paid....
"'Exhibit A.
"'Indianapolis, Indiana, May 14, 1927, for value received, I promise to pay
to the Order of Mina E. Spencer, two hundred fifty dollars, together with interest
at 3Ol% per month, from date until paid. I give my note.
"'D. M. Luse."'
The lower court allowed the claim for $250 with $51.23 interest. On appeal one
of the appellant's assignments of error was that the decision was not sustained
by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law. It is apparent from the claim
that the appellant attempted to proceed on the theory of money had and received.
The court said, however, that since the only evidence which the plaintiff offered
to support her theory was the note and since this note was invalid the judgment
of the lower court shbuld be reversed.
As to whether or not an .invalid promissory note can be introduced in evidence
to prove money had and received by the defendant, it seems to be the general
rule that any writing relied on as establishing by its terms a claim or right will
be excluded from the jury if it is so defective, either in substance or in form,
that the court is able to say as a matter of law that it is an invalid instrument.
"Void or Defective Instruments," 22 C. J. 859; Westerman v. Foster, 57 Ind.
408 (1877). Therefore, although the court did not decide as to whether or not
the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a cause on the theory of money had and
received, the court did decide that the plaintiff could not prove such a count
by an invalid, promissory note. It will be noted that the court, in making its
decision, had to determine the status of a contract made in violation of the
Indiana usury statutes.
The contention of the appellant was that "section 9777 et seq. Burns' Ann.
St. 1926" controls this case. That statute is an act of 1917 and provides in part
that "No person, copartnership or corporation shall make any loan of money,
credit, goods or things in action in the amount or to the value of three hundred
dollars or less, whether secured or unsecured, and charge, contract for, or receive
therefor a greater rate of interest than eight per centum per annum, without first
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obtaining a license from the auditor of the State of Indiana." The statute further
provides that upon failure to comply with it a penalty shall be imposed, thus
making noncompliance a criminal offense.
The appellee contends that the loan as such is not void, but that only the
interest in excess of the legal rate cannot be recovered as provided in "section
9331 Burns' Ann. St. 1926": "When a greater rate of interest than is hereby
allowed shall be contracted for, the contract shall be void as to the usurious interest contracted for." This statute did not make it a criminal offense to contract for a greater rate of interest than eight per cent. The appellee also cited
"chapter 220, Acts of 1929," in support of his contention. But the court said that
neither of these laws controlled since the question of the validity of a usurious
note depends upon the statutes existing at the date of the note, which, in this
case, is May 14, 1927. At the time of the making of the note in question the
Act of 1917 was in effect and not the Act of 1929. The court said that section
9331 Burns' Ann. St. 1926 is section 4 of an act of 1679 (apparently this is an
error in the report because section 9331 Burns' Ann. St. 1926 is identical with
Section 4 of the usury act of 1879) and is clearly one intended to govern the
general law in Indiana on interest and usury, while the act of 1917 specifically
regulates the law on interest on loans for $300 or less. This Act is generally
referred to as the "Petty Loan Act." It is apparent, therefore, that the Act
of 1917 is the one under which the court had to decide this case. The court said
that this Act was one defining public policy and contracts in violation of it
were void as against public policy.
In determining whether or not an agreement is illegal
as being in violation
of a statute the question must first be answered as to whether or not the acts
contemplated are prohibited by statute and the answer, in turn, to this question
depends upon the construction of the statute. In every case the intention of the
legislature must govern. People v. Marx, 2 N. E. 29 (N. Y. 1885); De Kam v.
City of Streator, 146 N. E. 550 (Ill.
1925). A statute may render an agreement
illegal by expressly prohibiting it or by imposing a penalty without an express
prohibition. It has been held that where a statute expressly provides that a violation of it shall constitute a misdemeanor, a contract in violation of it is illegal,
although the statute does not expressly prohibit the contract nor declare it void.
Beecher v. Peru Trust Company, 49 Ind. App. 184 (1912); Mulliken v. Davis,
53 Ind. 206 (1876); Shelton v. Bliss, 7 Ind. 77 (1855); The Winchester Electric
Light Co. v. Veal, 145 Ind. 506 (1896). Some cases hold that where a statute
imposes a penalty for an act or omission it impliedly prohibits it. Sandage v. The
Studebaker Brothers Manufacturing Company, 142 Ind. 148 (1895). The weight
of authority seems to be that the imposition of a penalty is only prima facie
evidence of the intention to prohibit. Springfield Bank v. Merrick, 14 Mass. 322
(1817).
Thus it can be seen that Indiana follows the rule of construction that where
a statute provides a penalty for doing an act, although it does not expressly
prohibit it in terms, an agreement to do such an act is illegal. Consequently, in
this case the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed no recovery on the count for money had and received because the plaintiff's only evidence to prove his cause of action was the note which the court
held to be illegal since made in violation of the Indiana "Petty Loan Act" of
1917 and, therefore, not admissible in evidence under the general rule that invalid instruments will be excluded from the jury.
Stanley A. Rosenstein.
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W=s-LrrxaS As-TsTAwmNTARy INTNT.-In an action brought by
Thomas A. Henry for the probate of an instrument offered as a codicil to the
last will of Maggie Henry, deceased, and contested by Archibald Drew and another, the court found as a matter of fact that Maggie Henry died September 30,
1929, and was survived by Thomas A. Henry, her husband, Archibald Drew and
Myrtle Irwin, two children by a former marriage. On September 8, 1923, she
executed her will in which she gave all of her estate to her two children. The
will was drawn up by Robert A. Speed, an attorney in Detroit. On September
20, 1929, six days before her death, she sent the following letter to Mr. Speed:
"Sometime ago I had you make my will, I wish to change it as follows:
"All of my property, estate, and holdings to be equally divided between my
son Archie, my daughter Myrtle, and my husband Thomas A. Henry, each to
receive one-third of my entire estate, real and personal.
"Maggie Henry
X
(Her cross)
"Bessie Yeager.
"Signed in presence of:
"Mrs. Bessie Yeager,
"Clara M. Whiting."
The letter was mailed to Mr. Speed and he acknowledged its receipt on
September 23, 1929. The former will was offered for probate on her death, and
Thomas A. Henry offered the letter as a codicil thereto.
The court held that since the only question was whether or not the instrument
was a codicil and testamentary in character and that since she intended to
change her original will and the instrument names the beneficiaries, states what
portion of her estate each shall take, and is executed with all the formalities
required by the statute, then it is manifest that it was her intent that it should
operate as a will. In re Henry's Estate, 244 N. W. 141, 259 Mich. 499 (1932).
The same court, no later than nine months afterwards, on an appeal of the
case, completely reversed their former decision, holding that the paper signed
by the tesfatrix and two witnesses was intended merely as a letter instructing
her attorney to prepare a modification of her will and was not as a codicil
thereto. In re Henry's Estate, 263 Mich. 410, 248 N. W. 853 (1933). The reader
perceives that the court in the first decision held that this informal document
was executed anima testandi.
In determining whether the animus testandi was present when the testator
signed or wrote an instrument, the courts have more and more leaned to the
strict view and gathered the intention from the face of the instrument.
If the courts were to permit parol testimony to show that the time of the
execution of an instrument proposed as the last will and testament of a testator
he did not know or suppose he was executing a will, where the animus testandi
appears on the face of the instrument, there would be manifested a tendency to
place all wills at the mercy of extrinsic evidence, thus outweighing the sanction
of a solemn act. This would violate the policy and spirit of the various wills
acts and would open the door for the perpetration of frauds upon deceased
persons.
In In re Kennedy's Estate, 159 Mich. 548, 124 N. W. 516 (1910), where the
testator, while of sound mind and laboring under no mistake of fact, executed
a paper in the form of a will, disposing of his estate, with knowledge that he
could revoke it at any time, and the paper was properly signed and attested by
witnesses, the court held that the evidence of declarations made by the testator
of a collateral purpose in executing the paper, that he did not intend it to
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operate as a will, was inadmissible in proceedings to contest the will, as a
presumption of testamentary intention arises from the deliberate execution by a
competent person of a paper in the form of a will in strict pursuance of the
statute, and the will could have been revoked at any time.
In Ellison v. Clayton, 163 AtI. 695 (Md. 1933), a letter was written by the
decedent to a trust company, signed by decedent and two witnesses, and stated,
in substance, that the decedent had four accounts in trust company's bank,
specifying them, and that he desired that to each of such accounts be added the
name of his daughter, and that he was to sign all checks so long as he was
physically able, and that the change in accounts was made with express intent
of balances becoming automatically the property of his daughter on his decease.
This was properly signed and attested according to the statute. The court held
that it was testamentary in character and could be read as a codicil to the will.
The court's liberal view could be explained in the light of extrinsic evidence that
was introduced to show that the intention of the deceased was testamentary.
It would seem from the foregoing that the courts are very careful when it is
a question of interpreting the intention of a testator, because of the chances of
perpetrating a fraud on a deceased person are increased by a liberal view. In
re Richardson, 94 Cal. 63, 29 Pac. 484, 15 L. R. A. 635 (1892), it was held that
a letter does not constitute' a will or codicil thereto when not written in extremis
or in contemplation of very near death, although the writer, in addressing his
sister, says: "My health is probably ruined and I want to anticipate possibilities.
You and your children get everything." The letter also expressed a wish for
the education of her boy and his desire as to his profession and training. The
court held that since the writer was not in extremis, or even in his last illness,
such instrument could not be interpreted as being testamentary.
Again in In re Jensen's Estate, 37 Utah 428, 108 Pac. 927 (1910), the decedent wrote a letter to petitioner, discussing in a general way their plans after
they were married, and stating therein that he would make the petitioner his
sole heir, whether they were married or not, and if he died before they were
married, he would make her his legal heir, "but I hope I will enjoy your company and association before that, now this is only talk, I don't expect to die,
but I am just telling you what I mean." The court properly held that the letter
was not intended as a present disposition of decedent's property, but merely expressed an intention to dispose of it at some future time, and was not admissible
to probate as a will.
In Succession of Monvant, 12 So. 549 (1893), the declarations of the testator
are admissible to prove that the document is in his handwriting, but not to
prove his intention.
In the case of Lungren v. Swartzwelder, 44 Md. 482 (1876), it was held that
where a paper was found among various other articles at the store of the deceased, containing a list of what deceased owned, of sums to be paid certain
people out of the sale of certain property, and named the defendants as executors,
was not a will. The court found that it was incomplete and unfinished because
it did not dispose of his whole property, and left out the name of his residuary
legatee, saying: "We must look to the entire paper, treating it as a whole, and
to all the acts and declarations of the writer relating to it." In this case the
court undoubtedly would have, if they were following the more liberal view,
come to an exactly opposite decision and held that his intention was clearly expressed.
The courts have shown that where there is expressed on the face of the
instrument a present testamentary intention they will construe it as such. In
Barney v. Hayes, 29 Pac. 282 (Mont. 1892), where a letter written by a testator
to his attorney saying: "What I want is for you to chafige my will so that she

